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Abstract 
Credit instability can cause severe negative impact to the long-term economic growth. It is also 
directly related to the recurring systemic banking and financial crisis. Driven by these motivations, 
this study aims to empirically analyze the factors that might explain credit cycle at bank level by 
taking Malaysia as the case study. We aim to make a comparison between Islamic and conventional 
banks by identifying whether the factors accounting for credit cycles between the two systems are 
different. By dividing the estimations into two data sets, the findings suggest: lagged credit cycle, 
asset price, excessive extension of bank credit and capital outflow are the factors that might 
influence credit cycle in the long term. While in the short-term, the factors are asset price, 
availability of loanable funds, banks’ capital, banks’ size, inflation, real interest rate, and capital 
outflows. Interestingly, our analysis supports empirically that there are some differences between 
Islamic and conventional banking system. Our findings acknowledged that Islamic banks hold 
some unique characteristics in the principles of its operations. Another important implication is 
that policy makers and industry players could observe the behaviour of the suggested factors and 
take the right actions to reduce the severity of the impact of unpredictable credit crunch.  
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1.0 Introduction: Issue Motivating the Study 
The process of financial development involves channelling saving from surplus unit to productive 
investments. This process allows for risk diversification, and the movement of funds in the 
economy will guide to the increase in economic activities and thus foster growth in the long run. 
The importance of well-functioning banking system to a country’s economic development has 
strongly been supported by numerous empirical researches which typically in the context of 
finance-growth nexus (King and Levine, 1993; Levine and Zervof, 1998). Generally, this line of 
research measures the depth of financial markets and institutions by the size of private credit 
relative to GDP, and concludes a significant positive effect on long term economic growth.  While 
a well-functioning banking system significantly boosts a country’s economic growth, the volatility 
in banking sector can also cause a lot of problems. This was evidenced by recurring banking crises 
resulting from malfunction of the banking systems which generate serious disruptions to economic 
activities. 
In the early literature, banking development was suggested to be positively and robustly 
correlated with the contemporaneous and future rates of economic growth, capital accumulation, 
efficiency of capital allocation, and productivity growth. The financial development could also 
significantly predict subsequent value of growth. This promotes the view that financial services 
stimulate economic growth by increasing the rate of capital accumulation and by improving the 
efficiency with which economies use that capital. Rajan and Zingales (1998) support this view by 
analysing cross country industry level data, and conclude that financial sector development 
positively influences industrial development.     
Accordingly, the recurring financial and banking crises have led to the increased empirical 
reassessments of finance – growth relation; among the recent literature are Moshirian and Wu 
(2008, 2012), Hume and Sentence (2009) and Lin and Huang (2012). The main focuses have been 
to identify the adverse effect of banking industry volatility and future economic growth with the 
attempt to determine the signal of crisis. Theoretically, financial instability occurs when shocks to 
the financial system interfere with information flows that disturb the financial system process of 
channelling funds to those with productive investment opportunities and hence is likely to result 
in a contraction of output (Lin and Huang, 2012). Empirically, Moshirian and Wu (2009) suggest 
  
 
that bank volatility is a good determinant of banking crisis for the subsample of developed markets, 
and this result is robust to the controls of macroeconomic indicators that are traditionally thought 
to be the determinants of banking crises. As such, analysing the factors accounting for credit cycles 
is crucial to restrain the negative impact of credit instability to the long-term economic growth.  
Theoretically, there are many factors reported in the literature that could explain the 
volatility in credit supply. Credit cycles can be caused by the imperfection in bank credit markets 
(Weinberg, 1995). The results can come from three main factors which include a systemic 
tendency for banks to overextend themselves during general expansions of lending, government 
interventions, and the nature of credit market. Thus, credit cycles caused by banking expansions 
have received much attention in recent years as they are related with the notion of credit crunch, 
and strongly related to recent global financial crisis. Besides this, other theoretical papers such 
Bernake & Lown (1991), Weinberg (1995), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Rajan (1994), Rotheli 
(2012) have explained other factors that might account for credit cycle. Generally, the factors 
would affect either the demand side or supply side of credit or even both sides. As known, the 
theory would form the ground of a discipline, but they are still inconclusive, therefore, an empirical 
answer is required to sort out what really happened in reality.   
Bringing Islamic finance into the context, some scholars argue that the occurrence of the 
recent global financial crisis was due to the natural harm existing in conventional banking system 
that is purely led by interest based system or “riba” in Islamic terminology. In principle, Islamic 
banking possess some unique characteristics in both sides of its balance sheets, whereby the 
contract of attracting deposits and giving financing are different from those of the conventional 
practices. Theoretically, conventional banks’ operations are based on pure loan system by charging 
interest and fees for services, but Islamic banks’ operations are based on profit and loss sharing, 
trading, leasing, charges for services provided, and using other sharia exchange contracts. 
Upholding these principles, Islamic banking should refer to a system of banking activities that is 
based on Sharia Laws that provide a fair platform to protect and benefit all parties involved in the 
transaction market and promote social harmony. The empirical research regarding Islamic banking 
and finance is still lacking.  
The increase in the importance of Islamic banks to the economy is undisputable. In 
Malaysia alone, as one of the major Islamic finance markets in the world, according to Bank 
  
 
Negara Malaysia (BNM), in 2012, Islamic financing accounted for 21% of total loan supply to the 
country. This figure starts from only 1% in 1997 and had grown substantially since the last 15 
years. This is similar in the case of deposit where Islamic deposit to total deposit had markedly 
increased from only 1.5% in 1997 to 22% in 2012.  These figures by themselves have 
communicated the increase in the importance of Islamic banks to the economy. This is supported 
by recent empirical study of Kassim et.al (2009), Sukmana & Kassim (2010), and Hasin & Majid 
(2011).  In these studies, they conclude that Islamic banks’ financing and deposit play important 
roles in the monetary transmission process in the Malaysian economy. In particular, both Islamic 
deposit and financing are shown to be statistically significant in linking the monetary policy 
indicator to the real output. 
Therefore, as another contribution to this line of literature, this paper tries to empirically 
answer two main questions; what are the factors that influence Islamic and conventional banks’ 
credit cycles? Are the factors accounting for credit cycles between the two systems different? In 
contrast to most of the previous empirical studies that only use the ratio of private credit to GDP 
or banks’ stock price as a measure of banks’ volatility, we additionally consider the volatility in 
the banking sector using bank-level data, and try to identify if there is any difference between 
Islamic and conventional banks by taking Malaysia as a case study.  
This paper extends the previous literature in the following aspects. First, the paper analyses 
credit cycles at bank level instead of at an aggregated or country level. Second, the paper estimates 
the credit cycles using a specified model and not just by using a ratio or a simple log change of 
credit. Third, taking into account the contribution of Islamic banks to the economy and the 
uniqueness of its characteristics, the paper makes an attempt to compare the results and try to 
justify whether the factors accounting for credit cycles of the two systems (Islamic and 
conventional) are different.  
The paper is organized as follows. The next section is the main objective of this paper. 
Section 3 presents a brief theoretical framework of credit cycle. Section 4 discusses the literature 
review of credit cycle. Section 5 describes the method employed in this paper. Data overview and 
descriptive statistics are provided in Section 6. In Section 7 empirical results, applying the tools 
described in Section 5 are discussed. Section 8 provides summary of results and some policy 
  
 
implication. Finally, Section 9 brief out some concluding remarks pointing out directions for future 
research. 
2.0 Objectives 
Driven by the above motivations, specifically the paper tries to fulfil two main objectives: 
First, this paper aims to empirically analyse the factors that influence Islamic and conventional 
banks’ credit cycles in Malaysia at a bank-level. 
Second, to make a comparison between Islamic and conventional banks by identifying whether 
the factors accounting for credit cycles between the two systems are different.                                                                   
3.0 Theoretical Framework 
Generally, we would define credit cycle as the cycle involving the supply of credit by lenders, or 
the access of credit by borrowers. The “cycle” indicates the swing between high and low credit 
availability. Therefore, either significant reduction or significant increase in the credit supply 
would cause the “cycle”. Numerous literatures have made the attempted to provide the theoretical 
ground in this area of research, which latter could be divided into several main groups of 
proposition. 
Rajan (1994) argues that credit cycles occur due to the influence of other banks. The 
influenced by other banks is not on the supply side but the changes in credit quality of the borrower 
which is the demand side. Intuitively, banks would maintain their credit policy only if borrowers 
have positive net present value. Therefore, in the absence of central bank intervention, the supply 
side should not exert independent influence on the level of credit.  
Supporting the above, Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) present theoretically how credit 
constrains interact with aggregate economic activity over the business cycle. Shock to technology 
or income distribution might generate large, persistent fluctuation in output and assets prices. 
Therefore, credit constraints arise “naturally” because lenders cannot force borrowers to repay 
their debts unless it is secured. In this view, recessions lead to booms, and booms lead to 
  
 
recessions. In other words, this view reflects that credit is like economy and business which is 
“procyclical”. 
 
 In slightly different perspective, Bernake & Lown (1991) point out that credit cycles are 
directly related to credit crunch. They define credit crunch as significant reduction in the supply 
curve for bank loan. The argument is that cycles in lending could be the result of weak demand or 
supply for credit or both. Weak demand for credit generally cause by the weak state of borrower 
balance sheets as a result of weak economic conditions or recession. On the other hand, reduction 
in the supply of credit might be caused by four main factors which are; availability of loanable 
funds, securitisation of bank assets, overzealous of regulations and shortage of bank equity capital.  
In short, Bernake & Lown (1991) focus that credit cycle is much influenced by the supply 
side which is the bank specific factors as compared to the demand side. In addition, the 
macroeconomic factors are not being emphasis since they argued that intuitively, it can affect both 
sides of the system.  In relation to this, by taking into account the macroeconomic factors and 
based on asymmetric information theory of financial instability, Mishkin (1998) listed out four 
main factors causing financial instability. The four main factors are, increase in interest rates, 
deterioration in banks’ balance sheets, stock market decline and increase in uncertainty. All of 
these factors would worsen adverse selection and moral hazard problems, which then lead to 
foreign exchange crisis that may decline economic activities, this would lead to banking crisis thus 
dampen the decline in economic activities. Concisely, the four main factors are related and will 
cause a series of break in the system. 
In a more detail explanation, increase in interest rates will increase the probability of bad 
credit risk, which cause the lenders to reduce credit supply, resulted in decline in investment and 
economic activities. A sharp decline in stock market would lead to a large decline in the market 
value of firms’ net worth. Firms’ net worth has similar role to collateral, and when the value of 
collateral declines, it provides less protection to lenders so that losses from loans are likely to be 
more severe. Deterioration in banks’ balance sheets would follow by reduction in the capital, thus 
point up the bank to either: reduce their lending in order to shrink their asset base and thereby 
restore their capital ratios; or raise new capital.  
  
 
Weinberg (1995) argues that credit cycles can be caused by the imperfection in bank credit 
markets. The imperfection can come from three main factors which include a systematic tendency 
for banks to overextend themselves during general expansions of lending, government 
interventions, and the nature of credit market. Among these factors, credit cycles causes by 
banking expansions which is the bank’s behaviour in lending have received much attention in 
recent years as it related with the notion of credit crunch. Excessive expansions activities would 
resulted from bank’s unrealistic optimism in good times, creating lending booms, thus would lead 
to significant increase in losses on loans. The cycle in lending standards coincides with the cycle 
in the amount of lending, which then followed by movements in loan losses. Therefore, in this 
view, lending activities and losses move in positive direction. The excessive extension of credit 
might result from banks’ excessive tolerant attitude toward credit risk which due to imperfect 
information and competition drives in the market.  
Summing up the above reviews, as discussed by Rotheli (2012), there are two groups of 
proposition define the notion of credit cycle. The first uncontroversial proposition simply state that 
lending is procyclical (Rajan 1994, Kiyotaki and Moore 1997). Secondly, farther reaching 
proposition of credit-boom or credit-crunch hypothesis holds that lending is not only cyclical but 
also excessive (Bernake & Lown 1991, Weinberg 1995).  
Focusing on the issues and objectives of this paper, the notion of credit cycles are directly 
related to credit crunch is more relevant to our research. Therefore, the literatures concerning credit 
crunch thus far point up to three main general factors that might contribute to credit cycle. First, 
the stock market which describe the condition of businesses or the credit quality of the borrower 
that could be measure by the asset price; second, the bank’s specific conditions that can be 
squeezed out from their financial statements; and third, the macroeconomic condition that could 
be represent by interest rate which can affect the both side of the system.  
Consequently, these theoretical views provide the fundamental ground for bankers, policy 
makers and researchers. However, they are still inconclusive without an empirical test to give an 
answer of what really happened in reality. 
 
 
  
 
4.0 Literature Review 
Motivated by the recurring banking crisis which is mainly linked to the credit crunch, recent 
empirical studies has expanded their efforts to reassess the finance – growth relations and 
empirically test the factors that might explain the credit cycle. Credit cycle is related to credit 
crunch, transmitted to systemic banking crisis and affect the economic conditions as a whole 
(finance –growth nexus). The empirical assessment of this big picture can be achieved from 
different direction.  
The fluctuation in banking system could be measured by the volatility in its stock price. In 
the context of finance-growth nexus, Moshirian and Wu (2009) study the relationship of banks 
volatility and banking crisis using macroeconomic and banks’ specific risk management 
determinants by utilizing the data from 18 developed and 18 emerging markets. Their result 
suggested that macroeconomic and banking risk management indicators have different impact on 
the probability of banking crises for emerging and develop market.  Specifically, banking industry 
volatility performs well in predicting systemic banking crises for developed markets but very poor 
for emerging markets, which suggest that the impact of market forces on the soundness of the 
banking system might be different for developed and emerging markets. In addition, 
macroeconomic and banking risk management indicators have different impact on the probability 
of banking crises. Therefore, the traditional cross-country results of the studies on banking crises 
need to be interpreted cautiously. 
In the latter version of the research, focusing on the same issue, but utilising a different 
technique, Moshirian and Wu (2012) investigates the relationship between banking industry 
volatility and future economic growth by utilizing the recent dynamic panel GMM estimation 
techniques for 36 markets. They reported a positive relationship between bank stock returns and 
future economic growth that is significantly influenced by a series of country-specific and banking 
institutional characteristics. Contrary to this, the negative link between banking industry volatility 
and future economic growth is significantly affected by government ownership of banks, the 
enforcement of the insider trading law, systemic banking crises, and bank accounting disclosure 
standards, while the impact of financial development is ambiguous.  
Within the same context but in a more definite approach, Lin and Huang (2012) define the 
bank volatility as the fluctuation in the credit. They estimate the volatility in banking system by 
  
 
the standard deviation of the growth of private credit. In spite of this, the results are still consistent 
with the previous research. The results provide evidence that banking industry volatility may exert 
a negative impact on growth in a more economically integrated world. The negative impact is in 
terms of the growth of industries that are more externally financially dependent, and this finding 
is robust to various sensitivity tests. However, the detrimental growth effect of banking sector 
volatility disappears when the sample is restricted to the relatively placid 1980s. Compared to the 
1980s, the 1990s are characterized by a more economically integrated world accompanied by more 
often unpredicted financial crises that disturb the banking sector. As such, the results imply that in 
a more economically integrated world, the stability of bank development may be important to long-
run growth. 
The analyses of bank volatility to growth have provided convinced answer that banking 
industry volatility may exert a negative impact on the long run economic growth. Looking it from 
a different angle, one might ask; what are the roots of the problem? Rephrasing it, what are the 
factors that might cause the volatility? Within this specific context, there are only a small number 
of empirical literatures making the attempt to answer the question. Among them are Gordon and 
He (2011), Rotheli (2012) and Hume and Sentence (2009).  
With the view that the changes in credit standard mainly driven by the borrower’s 
creditworthy, Gordon and He (2011) empirically test that credit cycles can occur without any 
change in the macroeconomic environment. In the theoretical model, they show that the bank 
competition for borrowers leads to periodic credit crunches, swings between high and low credit 
allocations. The reason is that bank lending standards vary through time due to strategic interaction 
between competing banks. Their argument was that in a credit crunch, all banks would raise their 
“lending standards”, and stop making loans to some borrowers who previously eligible to receive 
loans. These changes in credit availability are caused by banks’ changing beliefs, which based on 
the number of credit available and default performance of the rivals. In short, in this study, credit 
crunch derived from the changes in bank credit allocation. 
As discussed in the previous section, there are two groups of proposition define the notion 
of credit cycle, one is procyclical, and the second it is not only cyclical but also excessive. Rotheli 
(2012) follows a different lead and investigates the dynamics of banks’ expectations as a 
mechanism that can give rise to inefficient lending cycles. During recessions banks tend to become 
  
 
overly pessimistic regarding expected loan losses and hence overprice credit risk which may take 
the form of a credit crunch. Given the reported magnitude of the effects on loan-loss expectations, 
banks’ suboptimal learning can hardly be seen as the main driver of the credit cycle. 
Taking both theoretical and approach, Hume and Sentence (2009) provide analysis of the 
credit boom and the macroeconomic context in which it developed. Their findings suggest that the 
boom was unusually long and associated with neither particularly strong growth nor rising inflation 
in the economies in which it took place. This type of credit and financial cycle is hard to reconcile 
with existing economic theory and argue that, while the ‘‘global savings glut’’ may account for 
the cycle’s initial phase, other factors such as the conduct of monetary policy and perceptions of 
declining macroeconomic risk were more important from the mid-2000s onwards.  
From the above review of literatures, the findings relating credit cycle hypotheses are 
controversial. In addition, none of them address the analysis from the perspective of Islamic 
financing. The lack of empirical research focusing in this area has made the issue remained 
unresolved.  Therefore, this paper would like to make a humble attempt at addressing the issue 
with a view to filling up the gap in the literatures. 
5.0. Methodology 
Parallel with the objective of this study to analyse the determinant of credit cycle at bank level in 
Malaysia, this paper utilizes the panel techniques. Analysis of this paper involves two main steps. 
The first step is constructing the measure of credit cycles, and second, estimating the determining 
variables of credit cycles. The measure of credit cycle is estimated using panel fixed effect, and to 
estimate the determinants of credit cycle the paper utilize generalized-method-of-moments 
(GMM) estimation techniques developed for dynamic panel-data models. GMM techniques are 
preferred because they provide consistent estimators for the dynamic panel model. Compared to 
GMM, the OLS method has been criticized for generating biased coefficient estimates when 
applied to equations with lagged dependent variables and to the fixed effects model with a small 
time dimension (Moshiran and Wu, 2012). 
 In the second step we utilize two GMM techniques: the traditional first differenced GMM 
estimations, the recent system GMM estimations, we denote them as GMM(DIF) and GMM(SYS), 
  
 
respectively. As discussed by Moshiran and Wu (2012), GMM techniques are preferred because 
they provide consistent estimators for the dynamic panel model. Although the GMM(SYS) 
estimator can usefully overcome many of the disappointing features of the GMM(DIF) estimator, 
simulations suggest that the GMM(SYS) is not superior to GMM(DIF) in the circumstances when 
the autoregressive parameter is below 0.8 and the number of time-series observations is moderately 
large.  
In our case, the data set includes 35 banks with the longest time-series observation being 
15 and the shortest 4. The number of time periods is relatively small, and the autoregressive 
parameter is relatively larger. Therefore, in this case GMM(SYS) might produce superior result 
compared to GMM(DIF). Despite  this, we present the results based upon both GMM techniques 
5.1 Model Specification  
First, to construct the measure of credit cycle volatility, we follow Fidrmuc and Scharler (2013) 
and estimate the regression for each bank in the sample, 
∆𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑡 =  𝜆𝑖 +  𝜆𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡  
where, ∆𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑡 is the change in banks’ credit and 𝜆𝑖 and 𝜆𝑡 are time and bank’s fixed effects 
respectively. The estimated residual from this regression, ?̂?𝑖𝑡 , are the measure of credit cycles. 
Using this estimation, 𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑡 will vary between banks and time which able to exploit the panel 
structure of the data.  
𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑡 = log|?̂?𝑖𝑡 | 
In the second step, as suggested by theoretical literatures of Bernake & Lown (1991), 
Weinberg (1995), Rajan (1994), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), and Mishkin (1998), we have deduce 
that credit cycles can be caused by two main factors. First, the asset price that measure the 
conditions of businesses or the credit quality of the borrower, this denote the demand side. Second, 
the banks’ specific conditions that particularly effect the supply of credit. Lastly the third, the 
macroeconomic conditions that will act as the control variable since it can effect both demand and 
(1) 
(2) 
  
 
supply for credit. Therefore, we construct the determinants of credit cycles based on dynamic 
regression of the following general form:  
𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑡−1 +  𝛽1𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐵𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑀𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
Whereby, AP is asset price, BS is banks’ specific determinants, and ME is macroeconomic 
determinants. Also included, the lagged dependent variable to capture the persistence in 𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑡. 
In order to capture the difference between conventional and Islamic banks effect on credit cycles, 
interactive dummy is added in the estimation:  
𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽11𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽12(𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡 × 𝐼𝑆𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽21𝐵𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽22(𝐵𝑆𝑖𝑡 × 𝐼𝑆𝑖𝑡) +𝛽31𝑀𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽32(𝑀𝐸𝑖𝑡 × 𝐼𝑆𝑖𝑡) + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
 
a. Asset price 
Asset price is simply the log of market price index which is FBMKLCI in our case. As supported 
by theory, a sharp decline in stock market would lead to a large decline in the market value of 
firms’ net worth. Firms’ net worth has similar role to collateral, and when the value of collateral 
declines, it provides less protection to lenders so that losses from loans are likely to be more severe.  
b. Bank-specific determinants: 
In the supply side, excessive banks’ extensions of credit, capital constrains, and availability of 
loanable funds was suggested theoretically as banks’ specific determinants of credit cycles. First, 
excessive extension of credit might result from banks’ excessive tolerant attitude toward credit 
risk which due to imperfect information and competition drives in the market. Therefore, we proxy 
this condition with the measure of credit risk. Second, as explained by Bernake and Lawn (1991), 
credit crunch may be termed as capital crunch due to the strong evidence that support the links 
between bank capital and bank lending, hence we include bank capital to asset ratio as a measure 
of capital constrain. Third, intuitively, in order to lend, banks need to have funds, thus changes in 
deposit and other managed liabilities will measure the availability of loanable fund. In addition to 
(3) 
(4) 
  
 
these, we also include the bank size which measured by the log bank’s total asset with the aims to 
capture the behaviour of bank lending relative to its size.  
c. Macroeconomic determinants (the control variables): 
Macroeconomic determinants of credit cycles include GDP growth, inflation rates, interest rates, 
money supply to foreign exchange reserves, and depreciation of exchange rate. GDP growth and 
inflation rate will measure the economic condition of the country that reflects credit quality of the 
borrower that represents the demand of credit. This is in line with the notion of credit constraints 
arise naturally because lenders cannot force borrowers to repay their debts unless it is secured. 
Intuitionally, banks would maintain their credit policy only if borrowers have positive net present 
value. The short-term interest rate is included to capture the banks cost of funds, that may affect 
bank profitability increasing default rates. The ratio of M2 to foreign exchange reserves and 
exchange rate depreciation will measure the vulnerability of the banking system to sudden capital 
outflows triggered by foreign exchange risk.  
To estimate Equation 1 and 4 in, we use annual data collected from Bankscope and 
DataStream. The summary for indicators of each determinant, their definitions and sources are 
presented in Table 1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Table 1: Description and sources of variables 
Variables Descriptions  Data sources 
 Dependent variable  
a. cycle ∆𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑡 =  𝜆𝑖 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 , where, ∆𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑡 is the change in banks’ credit and 𝜆𝑖 and 𝜆𝑡 are time and bank’s fixed effects 
respectively.  𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑡 = log|?̂?𝑖𝑡 |. The estimated residual 
from this regression, ?̂?𝑖𝑡 , are the measure of 
credit cycles. 
Bankscope 
   
 Independent variables  
b. cycle
-1 Lagged value of cycleit = cycleit-1  
   
c. Asset Price:    
Market Index (KLCI) log of market index price of FBMKLCI DataStream 
   
d. Banks’ specific determinants:   
Excessive extension of credit or 
credit risk (RISK) 
 
Ratio of non-performing loan to total gross 
loan. 
 
Bankscope 
Capital constrains or capital crunch 
(CAPITAL)  
 
Ratio of total equity to total asset.                 Bankscope 
Availability of loanable funds 
(FUNDS) 
 
The changes of total deposits and managed 
liabilities. 
Bankscope 
Bank Size (SIZE) Log of bank’s total assets  Bankscope 
  
 
 
  
 
 Control variables  
e. Macroeconomic determinants:   
GDP growth rate (GROWTH) Growth = LOG(GDPt/GDPt-1). The GDP time 
series are constant prices.  
 
DataStream 
Inflation rates (INFLATION) Measured by the rate of changes in consumer 
price indices (CPI). 
 
DataStream 
Real interest rates (REALINT) Measured by the difference between three 
month treasury bill rate and consumer price 
index. 
 
DataStream 
Money supply to reserve 
(M2RESERVE)  
 
Ratio of M2 to foreign exchange reserve. 
 
DataStream 
Depreciation/devaluation 
(REALDEP) 
Changes in the rate of the real exchange 
rates. 
DataStream 
   
 
6.0 Data Description  
The data set include information for 19 conventional banks and 16 Islamic banks over the period 
of 1997 to 2006, with the longest time series being 15 years and the shortest of 4 years. This 
includes all local and international Islamic and conventional commercial banks in Malaysia. Due 
to the limitation on the availability of data for most Islamic banks, we decided to construct two 
separate estimation, first for Islamic and conventional banks with data range from 1997 to 2011 
(fifteen years), and second with data range from 2007 to 2011(five years). Therefore, we included 
21 banks in long estimation with 315 observations (2 Islamic and 19 conventional banks), and 35 
banks in short estimation with 175 observations (16 Islamic and 19 conventional banks). The 
  
 
summary descriptive statistics of primary variables and the list of Islamic and conventional banks 
included in the study are presented in Table 2 and Table 3, respectively.  
Table 2: Summary for descriptive statistics of primary variables 
 CYCLE KLCI FUND CAPITAL RISK SIZE 
Long Estimation       
   Mean  14.11467  6.806667  0.093407  10.31048  8.610630  16.52474 
   Median  14.13000  6.780000  0.085000  8.380000  6.165000  16.82000 
   Maximum  17.67000  7.330000  1.140000  35.34000  57.33000  19.63000 
   Minimum  9.970000  6.370000 -1.150000 -1.900000  0.100000  13.13000 
   Std. Dev.  1.109871  0.294999  0.240612  5.788724  8.145458  1.521603 
   Observations 315 315 315 315 315 315 
   Cross sections 21 21 21 21 21 21 
Short Estimation       
   Mean  14.08170  7.177115  0.122701  9.537538  3.538141  16.75456 
   Median  14.15559  7.280000  0.110759  7.900000  2.460000  16.75316 
   Maximum  17.41436  7.330000  1.065591  31.37000  23.23000  19.93000 
   Minimum  9.855253  6.780000 -1.150146  3.187000  0.080000  14.14000 
   Std. Dev.  1.206551  0.206588  0.274099  5.176910  3.863278  1.390157 
   Observations 175 175 175 175 175 175 
   Cross sections 35 35 35 35 35 35 
 
Comparing between the short and long estimations, the descriptive statistics for some 
variables are likely the same. This particularly reflected to CYCLE and SIZE, where the mean and 
standard deviation are likely the same, which most probably due to the comparable maximum and 
minimum value. For KLCI and CAPITAL, the mean and standard deviations are slightly different. 
On the other hand, for FUND and RISK, there are sizeable different in the mean and standard 
deviations of the short and long estimations. Hence, it is expected here that if the different are 
material, they should be reflected in the estimation.         
Table 3: The list of banks included in the study 
No. Name of Banks  Types of Banks Range of 
Data 
Estimation 
1. Affin Islamic Bank Berhad IS, Local 2007-2012 Short 
2. AmIslamic Bank Berhad IS, Local 2007-2012 Short 
3. Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad IS, Local 1997-2012 Short & Long 
4. Bank Muamalat Malaysia Berhad IS, Local 1999-2012 Short & Long 
5. CIMB Islamic Bank Berhad IS, Local 2007-2012 Short 
  
 
6. Hong Leong Islamic Bank Berhad IS, Local 2007-2012 Short 
7. Maybank Islamic Berhad IS, Local 2007-2012 Short 
8. Public Islamic Bank Berhad IS, Local 2007-2012 Short 
9. RHB Islamic Bank Berhad IS, Local 2007-2012 Short 
10. Al Rajhi Banking & Investment 
Corporation (Malaysia) Berhad 
IS, Int 2007-2012 Short 
11. Alliance Islamic Bank Berhad IS, Int 2007-2012 Short 
12. Asian Finance Bank Berhad IS, Int 2007-2012 Short 
13. HSBC Amanah Malaysia Berhad IS, Int 2007-2012 Short 
14. Kuwait Finance House (Malaysia) 
Berhad 
IS, Int 2007-2012 Short 
15. OCBC Al-Amin Bank Berhad IS, Int 2007-2012 Short 
16. Standard Chartered Saadiq Berhad IS, Int 2007-2012 Short 
17. Affin Bank Conv, Local 1997-2012 Short & Long 
18. CIMB Bank Berhad Conv, Local 1997-2012 Short & Long 
19. Hong Leong Bank Berhad Conv, Local 1997-2012 Short & Long 
20. Malayan Banking Berhad - Maybank Conv, Local 1997-2012 Short & Long 
21. Public Bank Berhad Conv, Local 1997-2012 Short & Long 
22. RHB Bank Berhad Conv, Local 1997-2012 Short & Long 
23. Alliance Bank Malaysia Berhad Conv, Int 1997-2012 Short & Long 
24. Bangkok Bank Berhad Conv, Int 1997-2012 Short & Long 
25. Bank of America Malaysia Berhad Conv, Int 1997-2012 Short & Long 
26. Bank of Nova Scotia Berhad Conv, Int 1997-2012 Short & Long 
27. Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ 
(Malaysia) Berhad 
Conv, Int 1997-2012 Short & Long 
28. Citibank Berhad Conv, Int 1997-2012 Short & Long 
29. Deutsche Bank (Malaysia) Bhd. Conv, Int 1997-2012 Short & Long 
  
 
30. HSBC Bank Malaysia Berhad Conv, Int 1997-2012 Short & Long 
31. JP Morgan Chase Bank Berhad Conv, Int 1997-2012 Short & Long 
32. OCBC Bank (Malaysia) Berhad Conv, Int 1997-2012 Short & Long 
33. Royal Bank of Scotland Berhad  Conv, Int 1997-2012 Short & Long 
34. Standard Chartered Bank Malaysia 
Berhad 
Conv, Int 1997-2012 Short & Long 
35. United Overseas Bank (Malaysia) Bhd. Conv, Int 1997-2012 Short & Long 
Note: IS: Islamic, Int: International, Conv: Conventional 
 
 
 
7.0 Empirical Results and Discussion 
In this section, we estimate the credit cycle in Malaysia in the panel analysis using data for the full 
sample of 35 banks which divided into long estimations of 21 banks and short estimation of all 35 
banks. Then, we test the possible determinants of the credit cycle using variables that were 
suggested theoretically. The objectives are to analyse the possible determinant of credit cycle and 
try to find out whether the factors account for credit cycle between conventional and Islamic 
banking system are different. To address this issue, we include interactive dummy of Islamic banks 
to cater the changes in the slope coefficient of Islamic banks if any.  
 Table 4 and Table 5 report the results for long data set estimations using GMM(DIFF) and 
GMM(SYS), respectively. While Table 6 and Table 7 present the results for short data set 
estimations using GMM(DIFF) and GMM(SYS), respectively. In each table, column 1 present the 
results from the regression of credit cycle on primary independent variables of KLCI, RISK, 
CAPITAL, FUND, and SIZE. Column 2 until 6 of each table present the regression results of credit 
cycle on primary independent variables with addition of one control viable, the aim is to see the 
macroeconomic effects on the regressions. At the bottom of each table, Robust t-statistics are 
reported in brackets. AB – AR1 and AB – AR2 are the Arrellano-Bond statistics for first and 
second-order autocorrelation of residuals. The results clearly indicate that our estimations fulfil 
  
 
the requirement of Arrellano-Bond statistics of having autocorrelation in the first order and no 
autocorrelation in the second order.  
 
7.1 Estimation of credit cycle with long data  
In column 1 of table 4, evidence by the p-value, it is clear that only RISK contribute 
significantly in explaining the credit cycle. However, after adding the macroeconomic variable in 
isolation, the results slightly change. KLCI appeared to be significant in the estimation that 
includes GROWTH, INFLATION and REALINT, none of the primary variables significant after 
including M2RESERVE and the results in column 6 is slightly the same as column 1 after 
including REALDEP. Out of the five macroeconomic variables, only M2RESERVE appeared to 
have significant effect on credit cycle.  
 
  
Table 4: Panel GMM (Differenced) estimations result for long data set 
DETERMINANTS OF CYCLE 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Constant 3.9588 4.1706 4.3402 4.4808 1.7155 2.9841 
 [0.406] [0.406] [0.369] [0.335] [0.725] [0.53] 
Cycle-1 0.1752 0.1554 0.1849 0.1713 0.1340 0.2173 
 [0.201] [0.219] [0.21] [0.225] [0.269] [0.138] 
Total (Islamic & Conventional)      
KLCI 0.6403 0.6673** 0.8262* 0.8319* 0.5663 0.6593 
 [0.113] [0.087] [0.019] [0.011] [0.16] [0.114] 
RISK 0.0355** 0.0371** 0.0378** 0.0373** 0.0394 0.0347** 
 [0.066] [0.066] [0.061] [0.064] [0.101] [0.065] 
CAPITAL 0.0133 0.0166 0.0157 0.0107 0.0418 0.0122 
 [0.614] [0.536] [0.566] [0.676] [0.243] [0.631] 
FUND 0.2546 0.23357 0.3007 0.2842 0.4301 0.2166 
 [0.427] [0.439] [0.354] [0.383] [0.193] [0.506] 
SIZE 0.1552 0.1458 0.0391 0.0256 0.2727 0.2154 
 [0.651] [0.659] [0.901] [0.929] [0.427] [0.518] 
GROWTH  0.7936     
 
 [0.502]     
INFLATION   0.0627    
 
  [0.279]    
REALINT    -0.0566   
 
   [0.482]   
M2RESERVE     1.1587*  
 
    [0.001]  
REALDEP      -0.1861 
 
     [0.462] 
Islamic (Interactive Dummy IS)     
IS(KLCI) -3.4058* -2.9585* -4.4657* -5.0561* -3.6388* -3.6258* 
 [0.008] [0.015] [0.041] [0.070] [0.016] [0.006] 
IS(RISK) -0.3003* -0.3166* -0.2895* -0.2915* -0.2967* -0.2806* 
 [0.005] [0.003] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] 
IS(CAPITAL)  -0.3533* -0.33924* -0.3818* -0.3687* -0.4010* -0.3152* 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
IS(FUNDS) 7.5651* 6.8074* 7.3565* 7.2559* 7.0021* 8.7287* 
 [0.017] [0.009] [0.005] [0.006] [0.023] [0.002] 
IS(SIZE) 1.8896** 1.6292 2.3716 2.8354 2.0259 1.4833 
 [0.067] [0.143] [0.158] [0.213] [0.107] [0.167] 
IS(GROWTH)  5.5610*     
 
 [0.004]     
IS(INFLATION)   -0.4003    
 
  [0.384]    
IS(REALINT)    0.5408   
 
   [0.383]   
IS(M2RESERVE)      -0.2265  
 
    [0.831]  
IS(REALDEP)      2.8541* 
 
     [0.000] 
AB - AR1 -2.582 -2.7167 -2.5246 -2.5325 -2.7731 -2.5565 
 [0.0098] [0.0066] [0.0116] [0.0113] [0.0056] [0.0106] 
AB - AR2 -1.7181 -1.5777 -1.4606 -1.531 -1.7499 -1.2694 
  [0.0858] [0.1146] [0.1441] [0.1258] [0.0801] [0.2043] 
Note: p-Values in parentheses, * indicate significant at 5% and ** indicate significant at 10% 
  
 
Table 5: Panel GMM (System) estimations result for long data set 
DETERMINANTS OF CYCLE 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Constant 3.2879 3.1429 2.9675 3.3070 1.6002 2.7626 
 [0.243] [0.365] [0.284] [0.279] [0.645] [0.339] 
Cycle-1 0.2138* 0.1931** 0.2166** 0.2101* 0.1735** 0.2425* 
 [0.038] [0.058] [0.062] [0.061] [0.075] [0.035] 
Total (Islamic & Conventional)       
KLCI 0.6627* 0.6621** 0.768* 0.7811* 0.6023** 0.6976* 
 [0.041] [0.053] [0.034] [0.050] [0.071] [0.028] 
RISK 0.0361** 0.0382** 0.0397* 0.0391* 0.0380 0.0333** 
 [0.076] [0.068] [0.043] [0.048] [0.104] [0.084] 
CAPITAL 0.0243 0.0266 0.0268 0.0242 0.0585 0.0226 
 [0.465] [0.437] [0.442] [0.481] [0.167] [0.477] 
FUND 0.2068 0.1866 0.2600 0.2432 0.4141 0.1686 
 [0.524] [0.547] [0.432] [0.468] [0.219] [0.606] 
SIZE 0.1580 0.1756 0.1220 0.1126 0.2370 0.1530 
 [0.435] [0.425] [0.587] [0.677] [0.242] [0.466] 
GROWTH  0.8414     
 
 [0.509]     
INFLATION   0.0511    
 
  [0.558]    
REALINT    -0.0461   
 
   [0.715]   
M2RESERVE     1.0592*  
 
    [0.008]  
REALDEP      -0.1765 
 
     [0.575] 
Islamic (Interactive Dummy IS)      
IS(KLCI) -3.1913* -2.749* -4.1346* -4.4793* -3.5196* -3.5428* 
 [0.002] [0.008] [0.026] [0.034] [0.006] [0.005] 
IS(RISK) -0.2957* -0.3057* -0.2840* -0.2980* -0.2897* -0.2523* 
 [0.005] [0.008] [0.002] [0.010] [0.002] [0.000] 
IS(CAPITAL)  -0.3835* -0.3495* -0.3955* -0.4007* -0.4328* -0.3017* 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.002] [0.007] [0.000] [0.000] 
IS(FUNDS) 8.1002* 7.2283* 7.8964* 7.8587* 7.4540* 9.2591* 
 [0.011] [0.004] [0.003] [0.002] [0.016] [0.001] 
IS(SIZE) 1.6920* 1.4907* 2.1229* 2.2172* 1.8696* 1.7777* 
 [0.001] [0.004] [0.026] [0.028] [0.005] [0.002] 
IS(GROWTH)  6.1246*     
 
 [0.001]     
IS(INFLATION)   -0.3200    
 
  [0.474]    
IS(REALINT)    0.3963   
 
   [0.466]   
IS(M2RESERVE)      0.0176  
 
    [0.985]  
IS(REALDEP)      2.8997* 
 
     [0.000] 
AB - AR1 -3.0313 3.0548 -2.9017 -2.9153 -3.1136 -2.9365 
 [0.0024] [0.0023] [0.0037] [0.0036] [0.0018] [0.0033] 
AB - AR2 -1.6949 -1.4805 -1.4531 -1.5326 -1.7178 -1.2744 
  [0.0901] [0.1388] [0.1462] [0.1254] [0.0858] [0.2025] 
Note: p-Values in parentheses, * indicate significant at 5% and ** indicate significant at 10% 
  
Accordingly, based on the findings, the results appeared to have expected sign, where the 
increase in RISK will increase the credit cycle. RISK is the measure of bank’s extension of credit 
risk, presented by the ratio of non-performing loan to total gross loan. It indicates the percentage 
of default from the total gross loan. High RISK implies high exposure of loss from total credit. In 
theory, the cycle in lending standards coincides with the cycle in the amount of lending, which 
then followed by movements in loan losses. Therefore, in this view, lending activities and losses 
move in positive direction. In other words, increase in lending activities lead to increase in losses 
which measure by the increase in credit risk that would result in reduction of credit supply. 
Recapping the definition, credit cycle is the cycle involving the supply of credit by lenders, 
or the access of credit by borrowers. The “cycle” indicates the swing between high and low of 
credit availability. Therefore, as either significant reduction or significant increase in the credit 
supply would cause the “cycle”, high RISK indicates high extension of bank’s credits that imply 
high loss which later on might lead to significant reduction in credit supply, and thus, contribute 
to credit cycle. Consistent with theory, as discussed by Weinberg (1995), excessive banks’ 
extensions of credit would result in unrealistic optimism in good times, creating lending booms, 
thus would lead to significant increase in losses on loans.  
Move on to asset price, KLCI was found to be positively significant in explaining the credit 
cycle. As expected, asset price and credit should have positive relationship since bank’s lending 
decision largely depends on borrowers’ credit quality. Asset price represent the market value of 
firms net worth that can imply the borrowers’ credit conditions in the market as a whole. As explain 
in theory, a sharp decline in stock market would lead to a large decline in the market value of 
firms’ net worth. Firms’ net worth has similar role to collateral, and when the value of collateral 
declines, it provides less protection to lenders, thus losses from loans are likely to be more severe. 
This view was also supported by Rajan (1994) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). They justify that 
changes in credit occur mainly due to the changes in credit quality of the borrower, it is because 
lenders cannot force borrowers to repay their debts unless it is secured. 
 
  
 
Scanning through the macroeconomic variables, only M2RESERVE contribute at 
significant order in explaining the credit cycle. M2RESERVE is simply the ratio of M21 to foreign 
exchange reserve. It is included in the estimation to cater the vulnerability of the banking system 
to sudden capital outflows triggered by foreign exchange risk. The results thus tend   to indicate 
that the credit cycle is sensitive to the flow of capital generated by foreign exchange risk, whereby 
increase in money supply relative to foreign exchange reserve will contribute to the increase in 
credit. Besides this, as mentioned, macroeconomic variables are the control variables incorporated 
in the estimations to test the relative impact of other independent variables in the estimations. The 
results in column 5 clearly depict that, after the inclusion of M2RESERVE, other primary variables 
appeared to be insignificant. This might suggest the sensitivity of credit cycle to the capital flow 
is very high as compared to asset price and other primary variable.  
Shifting to the interactive dummy variables for Islamic banks, the coefficients report 
significant value for most of the variables except for IS(SIZE) in estimation 2 until 6. 
Consequently, in answering the second question; are the factors account for credit cycle between 
Islamic and conventional system are different? Based on these estimations, they are statistically 
significant, thus suggest the factors account for credit cycle between the two systems are 
statistically different. However, it is too early for a conclusion since three main estimations have 
yet to be discussed. Most of the coefficient present negative sign suggesting the impact of the 
variables for Islamic banks are significantly lower compared to conventional banks. This is clearly 
the case for IS(KLCI), IS(RISK), and IS(CAPITAL). For IS(FUND) and IS(SIZE), they are 
positive suggesting the impact of these coefficient are higher.  
Comparing the results with GMM(SYS) estimations for the same data set (Table 5), 
evidence by the P-value, in column 1, it is clear that three variables contribute significantly in 
explaining the credit cycle, which include the  lagged of cycle, KLCI and RISK. After controlling 
macroeconomic factors, the results are quite consistent whereby only M2RESERVE appeared to 
be the only significant macroeconomic variable, however unlike the previous estimations where 
no other variables are significant, here, KLCI still remain significant.   
 
1 M2 = M1 + Narrow Quasi-Money. Narrow Quasi-Money = Savings Deposits + Fixed Deposits + NIDs + Repos + 
Foreign Currency Deposits Narrow Quasi-Money refers to the sum of deposits/ interest-bearing instruments 
(including SPI deposits and instruments) placed by the non-bank private sector with the commercial banks and 
Islamic banks (excluding interplacements among these banking institutions).  
  
 
In addition to the above, the significant in the lagged value of cycle is suggesting that the 
credit cycle can be explained by its own past value. This might support the proposition that credit 
is procyclical (Rajan 1994; Kiyotaki and Moore 1997) where it arises “naturally”. In this view, 
recessions lead to booms, and booms lead to recessions. 
Analysing the difference for Islamic banks, interestingly, all primary variables report 
significant coefficients proposing consistent implication with the previous estimations. In short, 
based on these estimations (GMM(SYS) for long data set), the factors contributing in explaining 
credit cycle between Islamic and conventional banks are statistically different. For Islamic banks, 
the slope coefficients are inclining for IS(KLCI), IS(RISK) and IS(CAPITAL) as evidence by 
negative sign. While the slopes are steeper for IS(FUNDS) and IS(SIZE).  
Most macroeconomic variables except M2RESERVE have no significant relationships 
with credit cycle, but some appeared to be significant for the dummy variables, this might point 
out to some explanation.  As in the previous estimations, IS(GROWTH) and IS(REALDEP) are 
positively significant that might indicate Islamic banks are more vulnerable to macroeconomic 
factors as compared to the conventional banks. Macroeconomic factors can influence both the 
demand and supply of credits. In economy, the interaction of demand and supply are complex, the 
cycle in credit might arise from distraction in borrower’s credit quality due to unprofitable project 
or reduction in loanable funds due to decrease in population aggregate income as a whole.  
Despite the above, the findings tend to indicate that credit cycle are not influenced by the 
availability of loanable funds, bank’s size and other macroeconomic variables such growth in 
GDP, inflation rate, interest rate and currency depreciation. However, these findings might only 
reflect the behaviour of specific banks that limited to specific time periods. To clarify the issue, 
we increase the number of banks in the analysis which will be discussed in the next section. 
 
 
7.2 Determinants of credit cycle with short data  
Recapping, estimations for short data set involve 35 banks (16 Islamic, 19 conventional) 
for five years (2007 – 2011). Scanning through the results presented in Table 6 and 7; the results 
  
 
are substantially different as compared to estimations in long data. Presented in column 1 of Table 
6, credit cycle can be significantly explained by CAPITAL and SIZE. CAPITAL is the ratio of 
total equity to total asset, it measure the extend of bank’s capital relative to its total assets. 
Consistent with theory, the positive sign imply a causal link between low capital-asset ratios and 
low lending growth in the subsequent recession, as implied by the capital crunch story (Bernake 
& Lown 1991). Reduction in the capital generally resulted from deterioration in banks’ balance 
sheets, thus point up the bank to either: reduce their lending in order to shrink their asset base and 
thereby restore their capital ratios; or raise new capital.  
However, as explained by Bernake & Lown (1991), an alternative interpretation is possible. 
Suppose that economic conditions are serially correlated, so that a state or region doing poorly 
today will likely do poorly tomorrow. Then the relationship between the capital- asset ratio and 
credit cycle found in this estimation might be spurious, since it may be that previous economic 
misfortunes in a state both caused bank capital to fall and implied slower subsequent economic 
growth (and thus slower lending). Under this interpretation, there is not necessarily any causal link 
between bank capital and bank lending.  
The capital crunch hypothesis implies that the most recent level of the capital-asset ratio is 
relevant to future lending, since it is the current level that must meet regulatory standards. Under 
the alternative interpretation, it is the recent change in the capital-asset ratio that should be relevant 
for predicting future conditions, since if recent times have been difficult the capital-asset ratio will 
have been falling, whereas if times have been good the capital-asset ratio will have been rising. 
This observation suggests inclusion of the recent change in the capital-asset ratio, together with 
the level of the capital-asset ratio, in the regression explaining lending.  
Consequently, we do not include the change in CAPITAL to clarify the issue. However, 
referring to column 2 of Table 6, GROWTH is insignificant implying that there is no statistical 
relationship between the growth rate of GDP and credit cycle. This is also the case for other 
macroeconomic variables except for M2RESERVE.  Hence, our estimation tend to reject the 
arguments, thus our estimations suffice the existence of causal relationship between banks’ capital 
and credit cycle.  
  
 
Moving on, the positive coefficient of bank’s size implies “the bigger the bank, the higher 
the credit cycle”.  SIZE in this case is simply measured by the size of banks’ total assets. Yet, a 
simple and direct deduction from the findings might point out to a bias conclusion. From different 
perspective, the bank’s size can possibly measure the stability of a bank and the extension of risk 
that the bank could take. A bigger bank could provide more credit as it is supported by large asset 
and high capital buffer. This is depicted in the results since both CAPITAL and SIZE appeared to 
be significant.  
Alternatively, the findings might also direct to behavioural economics of the credit cycle. 
From this outlook, the famous quote from recent global financial crisis of “too big to fail” will 
come into being. In this notion, besides of having large capital and asset, big banks are willing to 
take more risk due to the over optimism that the lender of last resort (the central bank) will always 
be the guard.    
The difference of Islamic banks is captured by the significant value of IS(CAPITAL). In 
all six estimations, IS(CAPITAL) report sloppy coefficient with about more than 25% difference.  
The sloppy coefficient evidence by the negative sign proposing the causal relationship between 
banks’ capital and credit cycle are lesser for Islamic banks. In other words Islamic financing are 
less vulnerable to sudden capital drop in banks’ balance sheets.  
Despite the above arguments and indications, GMM(SYS) tend to reflect considerable 
different result. In column 1 of Table 7, credit cycle can be explained by KLCI and SIZE, after 
controlling macroeconomic variables, only KLCI appeared to be significant and none of the 
variables report significant value in estimation 6.  Interestingly, despite M2RESERVE, 
INFLATION and REALINT also proposed significant coefficient. The findings might put forward 
that within shorter time period, the flow of credit are more responsive towards monetary policy 
conditions.  
 
  
Table 6: Panel GMM (Differenced) estimations result for short data set 
DETERMINANTS OF CYCLE 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Constant -38.2172* -40.6368* -30.0682* -26.7011* -5.3478 -38.6024* 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.008] [0.020] [0.548] [0.001] 
Cycle-1 -0.0184 -0.0224 -0.0414 -0.0435 -0.0275 -0.0290 
 [0.583] [0.486] [0.214] [0.194] [0.376] [0.374] 
Total (Islamic & Conventional)       
KLCI -0.6782 -0.8483 0.0396 0.3614 2.1095* -0.7295 
 [0.266] [0.302] [0.976] [0.790] [0.011] [0.332] 
RISK 0.0021 0.0024 -0.0117 -0.0154 -0.0363 -0.0002 
 [0.975] [0.969] [0.877] [0.839] [0.518] [0.998] 
CAPITAL 0.2564* 0.2670* 0.2106* 0.1915* 0.0446 0.2602* 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.002] [0.549] [0.000] 
FUND 0.4160 0.3832 0.5190 0.5418 0.5704 0.4210 
 [0.411] [0.403] [0.354] [0.336] [0.123] [0.397] 
SIZE 3.9858* 4.3099* 3.0241* 2.6401** -0.038 4.1103* 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.048] [0.091] [0.972] [0.001] 
GROWTH  -0.7770     
 
 [0.584]     
INFLATION   0.0878    
 
  [0.443]    
REALINT    -0.1685   
 
   [0.305]   
M2RESERVE     5.5205  
 
    [0.001]  
REALDEP      -0.0625 
 
     [0.862] 
Islamic (Interactive Dummy IS)      
IS(KLCI) 0.0087 0.1611 0.7646 0.8705 1.1205 0.1827 
 [0.996] [0.929] [0.716] [0.672] [0.518] [0.915] 
IS(RISK) -0.0689 -0.0677 -0.0766 -0.0780 -0.0871 -0.0701 
 [0.507] [0.490] [0.488] [0.482] [0.336] [0.494] 
IS(CAPITAL)  -0.3879* -0.3981* -0.3722* -0.36007* -0.2520* -0.3981* 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.010] [0.000] 
IS(FUNDS) 0.6893 0.5937 0.3674 0.3308 0.3766 0.5293 
 [0.565] [0.634] [0.772] [0.794] [0.729] [0.672] 
IS(SIZE) -1.4541 -1.7681 -1.3273 -1.19595 -0.47007 -1.6956 
 [0.320] [0.276] [0.502] [0.548] [0.752] [0.328] 
IS(GROWTH)  0.5009     
 
 [0.789]     
IS(INFLATION)   0.0598    
 
  [0.656]    
IS(REALINT)    -0.0878   
 
   [0.639]   
IS(M2RESERVE)      1.0341  
 
    [0.684]  
IS(REALDEP)      0.1569 
 
     [0.734] 
AB - AR1 -2.6688 -2.5535 -3.0115 -3.0558 -2.8639 -2.7096 
 [0.0076] [0.0107] [0.0026] [0.0022] [0.0042] [0.0067] 
AB - AR2 1.1285 0.84255 1.5585 1.6024 0.86574 1.1041 
  [0.2591] [0.3995] [0.1191] [0.1091] [0.3866] [0.2695] 
Note: p-Values in parentheses, * indicate significant at 5% and ** indicate significant at 10%  
  
 
Table 7: Panel GMM (System) estimations result for short data set 
DETERMINANTS OF CYCLE 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Constant 1.8455 1.9753 -0.6160 -0.6916 -5.2080 3.7901 
 [0.745] [0.722] [0.919] [0.910] [0.429] [0.542] 
Cycle-1 -0.0226 -0.0276 -0.0491 -0.0498 -0.0285 -0.0351 
 [0.496] [0.367] [0.151] [0.149] [0.382] [0.259] 
Total (Islamic & Conventional)       
KLCI 0.7696** 0.8327 1.5950** 1.749* 1.8724* 0.6950 
 [0.091] [0.135] [0.060] [0.042] [0.008] [0.147] 
RISK -0.1166 -0.1153 -0.0856 -0.0797 -0.0450 -0.1060 
 [0.128] [0.152] [0.312] [0.337] [0.464] [0.210] 
CAPITAL 0.0480 0.0513 0.0521 0.0512 0.0417 0.0551 
 [0.415] [0.404] [0.357] [0.358] [0.424] [0.379] 
FUND 0.9310** 0.9645 0.8923 0.8651 0.6281 0.9552 
 [0.084] [0.107] [0.164] [0.167] [0.120] [0.135] 
SIZE 0.4053 0.3707 0.1973 0.1693 0.0644 0.3309 
 [0.335] [0.408] [0.738] [0.776] [0.920] [0.471] 
GROWTH  0.6366     
 
 [0.634]     
INFLATION   0.1899*    
 
  [0.044]    
REALINT    -0.2977*   
 
   [0.025]   
M2RESERVE     5.0842*  
 
    [0.001]  
REALDEP      0.3580 
 
     [0.250] 
Islamic (Interactive Dummy IS)      
IS(KLCI) 0.9082 0.8030 1.6683 1.8045 1.8414 1.0510 
 [0.510] [0.579] [0.264] [0.210] [0.168] [0.439] 
IS(RISK) 0.0119 0.0117 -0.0355 -0.0432 -0.0781 -0.0028 
 [0.914] [0.916] [0.769] [0.717] [0.386] [0.981] 
IS(CAPITAL)  -0.2310* -0.2309* -0.2350* -0.2338* -0.2204* -0.2378* 
 [0.031] [0.033] [0.014] [0.012] [0.007] [0.023] 
IS(FUNDS) 1.3578 1.20281 0.9627 0.8972 0.6041 1.1767 
 [0.227] [0.295] [0.428] [0.460] [0.581] [0.318] 
IS(SIZE) -0.2901 -0.2415 -0.6504 -0.7024 -0.8198 -0.3580 
 [0.643] [0.712] [0.343] [0.285] [0.251] [0.564] 
IS(GROWTH)  -0.7244     
 
 [0.685]     
IS(INFLATION)   0.0474    
 
  [0.684]    
IS(REALINT)    -0.0860   
 
   [0.591]   
IS(M2RESERVE)      1.9403  
 
    [0.432]  
IS(REALDEP)      -0.1424 
 
     [0.714] 
AB - AR1 -2.8265 -2.9123 -3.2798 -3.2765 -2.824 -3.1114 
 0.0047 0.0036 0.001 0.0011 0.0047 0.0019 
AB - AR2 0.34604 0.48406 1.7614 1.7731 0.88455 1.0808 
  0.7293 0.6283 0.0782 0.0762 0.3764 0.2798 
Note: p-Values in parentheses, * indicate significant at 5% and ** indicate significant at 10% 
  
 
INFLATION and REALINT are measured by the rate of changes in consumer price indices 
(CPI), and the difference between short-term interest rate and the contemporaneous inflation rate, 
respectively.  Intuitively, the definitions of these two variables already give the hint towards 
refection of the results in a shorter term. Increase in interest rates will increase the probability of 
bad credit risk, because higher interest rate indicates higher cost of borrowing to the borrower and 
also higher cost of funds to the lender. Inflation on the other hand does not demonstrate direct 
connection to the lending. Inflation might increase the cost of living to and the cost of doing 
business to the borrower. Inflation also may act as a discount factor for the returns on investments 
that effect both borrower and lender.  These factors might cause the lenders to reduce credit supply, 
which latter resulted in decline of investment and economic activities. 
The difference of Islamic banks reported in GMM(SYS) estimations are consistent with 
GMM(DIF) where IS(CAPITAL) report sloppy coefficient with about more than 20% difference. 
The finding strengthens the position that Islamic financing are less vulnerable to sudden capital 
drop in banks’ balance sheets. Under the international banking regulations of Basel II and IFSB 
(Islamic Finance Service Board), Islamic banks faced higher stress on capital as compared to 
conventional banks. This is due to the nature of its operations that mainly based on trading and 
profit and sharing. Transaction based on trading and partnership hold higher risk compared to 
transaction based on pure loan. Due to this, the international banking regulations imposed high 
risk weight on Islamic banking products. As a result, Islamic banks need to hold higher capital. 
Numbers of arguments arise due to this issue, particularly related to the decrease in the efficiency 
of Islamic banks. Conversely in our case, higher capital holding might put Islamic banking at 
advantage since they were more shielded to sudden capital crunch that might trigger extensive 
credit reduction and banking crisis.    
Pooling the two techniques of estimations together, in a shorter term, the results suggested 
the determinants of credit cycle are CAPITAL, SIZE, KLCI and M2RESERVE for GMM(DIF), 
and KLCI, FUND, INFLATION, REALINT and M2RESERVE for GMM(SYS). However, as 
discussed by Moshiran and Wu (2012),   in the case that the number of time periods is relatively 
small, and the autoregressive parameter is relatively larger, GMM(SYS) might produce superior 
result compared to GMM(DIF).  
  
 
8.0 Summary of Results and Policy Implications 
Analysing the factors accounting for credit cycle is crucial to restrain the negative impact of credit 
instability to the long-term economic growth. By identifying the determinants of credit cycle 
measurable control system could be suggested to the policy makers and industry in order to reduce 
the severity impact of unpredictable banking crisis. Summary of results are presented in Table 8, 
from this, several policy implications could be derived. Referring to the table, the results reported 
for both objectives are considerably different between long estimations and short estimations. 
Hence, we could infer the deference exist are in terms of the time frame, long data set estimations 
would capture the long-term and short data set estimations would capture short-term behaviour of 
credit cycles.       
 In long term, the results suggested four factors account for credit cycle, those are CYCLE-
1, KLCI, RISK and M2RESERVE. These factors report positive sign indicating any increase or 
decrease of these factors will give causation effect to the cycle of credit. On  the other hand, for 
short-term, KLCI, FUNDS, INFLATION, REALINT, and M2RESERVE are among the list, in 
addition to this, CAPITAL and SIZE could also be included. The suggested sign are positive and 
consistent in all estimations.  
Table 8: Summary of results 
Objectives Long Estimations  Short Estimations 
 GMM(DIF) GMM(SYS)  GMM(DIF) GMM(SYS) 
      
Determinants of  KLCI CYCLE-1  KLCI KLCI 
credit cycles RISK KLCI  CAPITAL FUNDS 
 M2RESERVE RISK  SIZE INFLATION 
  M2RESERVE  M2RESERVE REALINT 
     M2RESERVE 
      
The difference of IS(KLCI) IS(KLCI)  IS(CAPITAL) IS(CAPITAL) 
  
 
Islamic banks IS(RISK) IS(RISK)    
 IS(CAPITAL) IS(CAPITAL)    
 IS(FUND) IS(FUND)    
 IS(SIZE) IS(SIZE)    
 IS(GROWTH) IS(GROWTH)    
 IS(REALDEP) IS(REALDEP)    
 
 The difference of Islamic banks is more obvious in the long term where all the primary 
variables plus two macroeconomic variables indicate significant different. Even though some of 
the variables are not significant in the main estimations, the significant of dummy variables clearly 
indicate the differences between the two systems do exist. In shorter term, only capital is 
significantly different. However, the difference in capital contains high implication as discussed 
in the previous section.   
 Policy makers and industry players could observe the behaviours of these suggested 
variables and take the right actions to reduce the severity impact of unpredictable credit crunched. 
As explained in theory, these banking and economic factors are not standalone component in the 
system, these factors interact and affecting one another. For example, foreign exchange crisis may 
decline economic activities, lead to banking crisis thus dampen the decline in economic activities. 
Specifically the following policy implication could be list out: 
i. Implication for economic growth. Unpredictable credit crunch can cause negative impact 
to long term economic growth. By knowing the factors that might influence credit cycle, 
policy makers could control these factors for the benefit of future growth. Asset price report 
significant positive influence to credit cycle in all estimations. The authorities could use 
this as the indicator of credit health in the country; this is particularly useful for the purpose 
of monitoring and policy implementation.  The authorities could monitor the credit cycle 
by monitoring the level of interest and inflation rate. Increase in interest rate will increase 
the credit supply; accordingly, the authorities could slightly increase interest rate to avoid 
substantial reduction in credit supply. This is particularly the case for the short term.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
  
 
ii. Implication for monetary policy. The findings suggest bank lending are vulnerable to 
sudden capital outflows triggered by foreign exchange risk. Capital outflow is the 
movement of assets out of a country. It occurs when foreign and domestic investors sell off 
their assets in a particular country because they no longer perceive it as a safe investment. 
The capital is withdrawn from the country (flows out) and may end up in another country 
or back in the investor's home country. The authorities such Bank Negara Malaysia could 
implement capital control to tackle this issue. However, they need to be aware since 
excessive control can scare off investors who want control over their assets and can give 
the impression that something is wrong with the country's economy or government that is 
not yet widely known.    
 
iii. Implication for banking regulation. Compared to Islamic financing, conventional credit 
appeared to be more vulnerable to the drop in capital. As discussed in above, this might be 
due to higher capital charged faced by Islamic banks. For this reason, in a certain economic 
condition, the authorities could imposed higher capital requirement to banking sector to 
prevent capital crunch as it could give raise to credit crunch. However, the trade-off 
between banks efficiency should be carefully measured. The requirement could be made 
for a specific term since the findings suggest significant influence only in the short term.    
 
iv. Implication for Islamic banking system. Our findings acknowledge the different of Islamic 
banks especially in the long term. Islamic banking system that based on unique trading and 
profit and loss sharing system might provide the solution to the recurring banking crisis 
with the view to achieve more harmonise economy. However there are great deals of 
factors that need to be analysed before this strong deduction could be made. Regardless of 
this, Islamic banking system might further develop and lead the new banking reform since 
there is some empirical evidence supporting its’ sound banking system.    
9.0 Conclusions and limitations 
Taking Malaysia as the case study, based on our restrictive bank-level panel estimations, the 
factors accounting for credit cycle could be divided into two main proposition relative to time 
frame. First, in the long term, lagged of credit cycle, asset prices, excessive extension of bank 
  
 
credit and capital outflow are the factors that might influence credit cycle. While in the short-term, 
the influenced factors are asset price, availability of loanable funds, banks’ capital, banks’ size, 
inflation, real interest rate, and capital outflows. 
Rendering the determinants of credit cycle between Islamic and conventional systems, our 
analysis support empirically there are some differences between the two systems. It is 
acknowledged here that Islamic banks really hold some unique characteristics particularly in the 
principles of its operations. Hence, practicing Islamic banking system might reduce the severity 
impact of banking crisis to the long term economic growth. This deduction has a very strong policy 
implication to the industry since we are struggling to find out the solution to recurring banking 
crisis with the view to achieve more harmonise economy.  
Then again, gazing the situation in a more comprehensive perspective, in a dual banking 
system with increase integration to globalization, Islamic banks do operate in the same 
environment as conventional banks. In the view that the law of demand and supply in the economy 
should affect all institutions in the same way, intuitively, Islamic banks could not effort to be 
unaffected. Therefore, whether the factors account for Islamic and conventional banks credit 
cycles are really different, a more comprehensive analysis should be made. In spite of this, the 
severity impact of a fall in bank lending to the macroeconomy as a whole depends on the 
availability of other forms of credit as substitute to banks loan. If the substitutes are available, a 
fall in bank lending will have only a small economic effect, if otherwise, the impact may be 
significant. Thus, even though Islamic banks do shield from some of the causing factors, it will 
not be the sole solution to the complex problems. Nevertheless, an alternative and sounder banking 
system has shades its light, the policy makers and industry has less reason to remain at the same 
position.       
Our analysis contains a number of limitations. This study is limited to Malaysian market 
within specific time frame. As a result, the deduction may not be generalized to the world’s 
complex environment. Hence, the study could be extended in the following ways. First, by 
increasing the number of sample, instead of focusing on a particular country, a mass sample could 
provide a more comprehensive findings. In addition, future study could also be done at aggregate 
level to capture the world complex environment as a whole and other neglected variables could be 
included in the estimations.     
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